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The exciting advances in modern communications and networking ability have spawned 
a revolution in decision support systems within the greater network centric framework.  
Note the ongoing development and operational use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
in the Global War on Terror and the geographically distributed C2 environment.  Sensor 
saturation and the maturation of mobile technology has advanced at rate in which the 
current crop of decision and sense making technology has failed to pace against.    This 
leads to one of the most interesting questions pertaining to the current field of decision 
support systems:  Which one is best suited for today’s rapidly adapting and evolving 
network centric tactical situations?  In this paper we introduce the concept of knowledge 
flow mesh dynamics within a decision support environment, which we argue is the 
logical heir to a new type of decision support system as seen through the network centric 
lens.    Using the ongoing work by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and United 
States Special Operations Command Tactical Network Topology (TNT) Field 
Experimentation as a framework for exploration, we offer a systems approach to 
identifying those criteria which form the basis for the new decision support system.  It is 
our goal that this model be incorporated in future versions of the NPS TNT Field 
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NPS and USSOCOM Field Experimentation 
 
The arrival of network centric operations (also, warfare) has identified a gap in the 
current field of decision support systems (DSS).  This is best exemplified by the current 
work underway by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)-Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Cooperative Field Experimentation Program.  As defined by 
Brigadier General Steven Hashem, United States Army, and director of the United States 
Special Operations Command Center for Knowledge and Futures, the purpose of the 
program is to “leverage experiments that identify key gaps and deficiencies resulting 
from applications of advanced technology, unmanned systems, and net-centric 
applications”.  It is this advanced research and proof of concept umbrella that has opened 
the door for a true decision support environment, one that is the prototype for a new, 
agile, adaptable decision support environment enabling knowledge flows and situational 
awareness as viewed through a network-oriented perspective (USSOCOM 2007). 
 
Under the auspices of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Network Innovation 
and Experimentation (CENETIX) and its director, Dr. Alex Bordetsky, Associate 
Professor, NPS, the early work under the joint field experimentation has evolved into 
what is now known as the Tactical Network Topology (TNT).  A number of subset 
experiments include the Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), the Johns Hopkins 
University / Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) Fully Autonomous Unmanned 
Aerial Systems (UAS) Cooperative Search and Tracking, United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) Distributed Operations, and Unmanned Ariel Vehicle Enhanced Battlefield 
Medical Situational Awareness and Tactical Networking (Naval Postgraduate School 
2007). 
 
In today’s dynamic, information rich, and high operational tempo, the need for a 
robust, resilient, and adaptable decision support environment is greater than ever before.  
Of particular emphasis here is the context of a “network-centric” approach or lens.  
Existing literature focuses on the development of the decision support system as a 
“system” under the control of one or more decision makers (Marakas 2003)).  Added to 
this is the need for a clearly defined problem statement which then, in turn, relates to a 
particular form of decision support system.  The form of DSS is based upon the problem 
structure, the type of outcome needed, and finally, the type of overhead or control 
required. 
 
Earlier attempts to bind the characteristics of robust decision support systems with the 
requisite ability to serve as a knowledge flow enablers to include the ability to adapt and 
mesh with existing networks and systems have come up short.  Articles and conference 
papers by such leading edge researchers as Bordetsky, Hayes-Roth and Vega, Clements, 
and Thompson have attempted to either bin the particular DSS as either hybrid (Vega, et 
 2
al. 2007) or place the functionality onto an architectural structure (Bordetsky, Hayes-
Roth 2007).   
 
Specifically, this paper will focus on what we are calling a Decision Support 
Environment within the greater network-centric context which allows for the 
identification and networking of relevant human and / or machine experts or nodes (who 
may or may not be an expert all the time but rather at a single, critical moment in time).  
The ability of the network to connect across geographically distant and sometimes 
environmentally challenging and operationally difficult domains is of equal interest.  In 
effect, we are trying to enable the dynamic transfer of knowledge across as yet to be 
determined network topologies and architectures at the right time and location.  
 
What we are saying in effect, is that the current and future networking capabilities to 
actually bring human decision makers and knowledge experts into the decision 
environment as “nodes” is an area that shows great potential for future exploration.  The 
human brain is very good at inductive type reasoning and making decision based on 
internal or “gut feelings” based on experience, judgment and emotion.  Computers and 
decision support systems excel at deductive type reasoning and completing repetitive and 
routine processing at extremely high speeds.  The ability to bring these two together into 
an operational framework capitalizing on the inherit strengths of each is only now 
beginning to take shape.  Hence the terms “human as a node” and “dynamic knowledge 




The expanded capacity and adaptability of today’s information systems and 
communication devices allow for an interesting addition to the current view of decision 
support systems.  This concept is what we call “human as a node”.  With this concept we 
introduce the ability of human agents to act as members of the network.  In the capacity 
of expert or non-expert, the ability of the network to adapt and adjust to environmental 
and operational needs in a resilient and dynamic way and identify those human agents 
who may at that critical time and place represent the key link or hub in the topology.  
These human actors may then switch from expert to non-expert in a given instance and 
thus the decision support environment adapts to strengthen the relevant links between 
nodes.   
 
USSOCOM and NPS TNT MIO 
 
At the individual level, this node is comprised of the human brain.  There is no better 
decision support tool available today.  The infrastructure of such models as the TNT MIO 
with its adaptive mesh topology and advanced command and control toolsets allow for 
the introduction of the human brain as a node in the network. 
 
The stated goals and objectives of TNT MIO 07-4 (Joint USSOCOM-NPS-LLNL 
Field Experiment Augmented by OSD/HD MDA Programs), to be conducted in the San 
Francisco Bay areas in September 2007 are as follows: 
 
The objective of this experiment is to continue to evaluate the use of networks, 
advanced sensors, and collaborative technology for rapid Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO); specifically, the ability for a Boarding Party to rapidly set up 
ship-to-ship communications that permit them to search for radiation and 
explosive sources while maintaining network connectivity with C2 organizations 
and collaborating with remotely located sensor experts.  
 
The particular goal for TNT MIO 07-4 is to take the discovery, constraints 
analysis, and situational understanding process of network-centric MIO to a new 
level of fidelity (Bordetsky 2007). 
 
The Arrival of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
 
Network Centric Warfare, or NCW, arrived on the scene in 1996, the result of a paper 
(and later book) by U.S. Navy Admiral William Owens in which he coined the phrase 
“system of systems”.  The objective of this paper was the ability of the United States 
military to achieve dominance through information superiority.  The use of intelligent 
sensors and advanced command and control methods were the platform to achieve this 
(Owens 2001). 
 
Many scholars point to 1998 and the reference article in the US Naval Institute 
Journal Proceedings by retired United States Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John 
Gartska and later expanded in the work by Alberts, Gratska, and Hayes entitled Network 
Centric Warfare as the real beginning of the network-centric movement.  This then was 
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the beginning of the movement to gain greater situational awareness and knowledge 
transfer utilizing the developing communications and information technologies then in 
development (Cebrowski and Gartska 1998). 
 
Known as “Yoda” or the “the Rabbi”, Andrew Marshall was a long serving RAND 
analyst (Nuclear Strategist starting in 1949) who many consider the initial proponent and 
author of “Network Centric Warfare”.  His position as the first and only Director of the 
Pentagon’s Office of New Assessment championed the advent of information technology 
as the initiator of a “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)”.  Brought on board during 
the Nixon administration in 1973, he has been reappointed by every President since.  
Similar in controversy and following to U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd and his 
“OODA Loop or Observe, Orient, Decide, Act Loop” (see Boyd’s OODA Loop model 
below) adherents, Andrew Marshall’s followers were known as the “Church of St 
Andrew”.  One of its earliest disciples was U.S. Navy Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski.  
Also counted among what is known in defense circles as the “Jedi Knights” is Dr. 
Andrew F. Krepinevich, West Point graduate, and Harvard PhD currently sitting as the 
Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a private 
government think-tank (McGray 2003). 
 
This is an important issue in that these men are responsible for the current state of 
defense transformation and are ushering the era of autonomous robots (armed and 
unarmed), unmanned aerial vehicles (armed and unarmed), and other advanced 
networking and communication technologies.  In fact, a recent Associated Press article 
signals the deployment of the first ever Air Force Robot Air Attack Squadron bound for 
Iraq (Hanley 2007): 
 
 “The airplane is the size of a jet fighter, powered by a turboprop engine, able to 
fly at 300 mph and reach 50,000 feet. It's outfitted with infrared, laser and radar 
targeting, and with a ton and a half of guided bombs and missiles.” 
 “The arrival of these outsized U.S. "hunter-killer" drones, in aviation history's 
first robot attack squadron, will be a watershed moment even in an Iraq that has seen too 
many innovative ways to hunt and kill.” 
 “The Reaper is expected to be flown as the Predator is - by a two-member team of 
pilot and sensor operator who work at computer control stations and video screens that 
display what the UAV "sees." Teams at Balad, housed in a hangar beside the runways, 
perform the takeoffs and landings, and similar teams at Nevada's Creech Air Force Base, 
linked to the aircraft via satellite, take over for the long hours of overflying the Iraqi 
landscape.” 
What is hidden in this glossy overview of the unmanned aerial attack vehicle is the 
decision support environment which supports it and enables it to accomplish the mission.  
As mentioned above, there is a small team of mechanics and maintainers in Balad, Iraq 
whose job it is to keep the craft flying and serves as launch and recovery specialists.  
They are networked with the actual pilot and sensor operator located at Creech Air Force 
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Base, Nevada (just outside of Las Vegas).  They in turn are networked to their Operations 
Center located in Tampa Florida, home of the U.S. Central Command, and finally, they 
are linked to the specific “actioning agent” on the ground in Iraq-typically U.S. Special 
Operations Forces, or SOF.  This is exactly the type of network centric world envisioned 
by Marshall, Cebrowski, Alberts, Et al.  (See figure below). 
 
Alberts, Gartska, Stein Network Centric Warfare 1999 
The key ingredient in all of this technology, however is and always will be the human 
in the loop or as we call it “human as a node”.  As stated by Alberts, Gartska, Stein in 
Network Centric Warfare (1999, 2nd Ed): 
“Actually, NCW is more about networking than networks.  It is about the 
increased combat power that can be generated by a network-centric force. As we 
will show, the power of NCW is derived from the effective linking or networking 
of knowledgeable entities that are geographically or hierarchically dispersed.” 
Looking back at the example of the Air Force Robot Squadron, the essential links are 
those maintained between the human agents handling the UAV and operating it.  This is 
where the decision support environment comes into play.  Three recent articles is the 
Journal of U.S. Special Operations Command “Tip of the Spear” argue exactly for this 
and serve to showcase the efforts of the Tactical Network Topology Field 
Experimentation:  
1. “Self-forming, agile networks tying unmanned systems to human activators” 
USSOCOM Tip of the Spear, January 2007 
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2. “Network centric environment created becomes a weapon for the commander” 
USSOCOM Tip of the Spear, January 2007 
 
“Real time data to command nodes”  
3. USSOCOM Tip of the Spear, January 2007 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of these developments is ability to link the various 
geographically distributed human actors (military personnel, state and federal employees, 
etc) into this grid of net centricity.  We will use the work being done by the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and the United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) under the auspices of the Tactical Network Topology Field Experiments as 
a case in point for the need to develop a decision support environment focused along a 
network centric approach to support knowledge flows.  The benefits are impressive and 
real.  As shown in the following diagram by Alberts et al., the pay offs have a tangible 
benefit to the current mode of thinking (1999). 
 
NCW and “The Edge” 
 
The arrival of the book Power to the Edge by Alberts and Hayes in 2003 was a 
landmark work in that it presented a picture where such advances in technology allowed 
for rapid exchanges of data and information in such a scale and tempo that the normal 
military (and business) organization structures could not keep pace.  In fact, they called 
for the recognition of smaller, “edge” organizations, acting in concert with one another, 
all sharing information and data in real time, with a common goal or objective.  There 
would be no traditional pushing of information from central information or knowledge 
repositories (think Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and individual Service intelligence agencies).  In fact, these edge 
entities would pull information as needed and share across the entire organization in a 
truly networked fashion.  They would operate and collaborate concurrently (Hayes, Et al. 
2003). 
 
IPV6 and the GIG 
 
The deployment of Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPV6) and the Global Information 
Grid (GIG) are citied two critical examples of the move towards aligning the military 
establishment within this network centric framework.  Critical in that they are seen as 
true enables of the Network Centric Operations movement (DoD Implementation of 
NCW 2006).   Others include the use of unmanned aerial platforms / vehicles (UAVs) 
and advanced communications devices such as the Joint Tactical Radio System (JITRS).  
The common denominator they all share is the ability to enable geographically diverse 
human agents to maintain an extremely high level of shared awareness and achieve rapid 






Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) quadruples the size of the address field from 32 
bits to 128 bits (IPv1-IPv3, and IPv5 reportedly never emerged from testing in the 
laboratory). IPv6 could theoretically provide each person on the planet with as 
many as 60 thousand trillion-trillion unique Internet addresses. Theoretically, by 
switching to IPv6, humanity will never run out of Internet addresses. IPv6 is also 
believed to be more secure than IPv4 because it offers a feature for encryption at 
the IP-level. 
 
IPv6 also offers other technical advantages over IPv4. For example, IPv6 makes 
peer-to-peer communication between individual computers much easier than with 
IPv4. This will make applications like Internet telephony and next generation 




During a recent speech at the United States Army’s LandWarNet (the Army subset of 
the Global Information Grid) conference in August of 2007, U.S. Army Secretary Peter 
Geren spoke of the need to stay focused on the arrival of new technologies which would 
“…seamlessly connect the leader to the soldier on the battlefield — and connect the 
soldier to the information he or she needs wherever and whenever he or she needs it.”  In 
addition, “We are spinning out the first of the [Future Combat Systems] technologies, 
unattended ground sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles,” 
Geren said. “Instead of line-of-sight radio and up-and-down satellite signals, 
LandWarNet and FCS will give us a three-dimensional mesh of ground, aerial and 
satellite platforms and nodes, with the soldier on the ground at the center of the effort.”  
Not mentioned during the speech was the critical task of enabling the decision making 
process to keep pace with this new technology (Geren 2007). 
 
In addition, Marvin Wages, Chief Information Officer (CIO)/G-6 Governance, 
Acquisition and Chief Knowledge Office (GACKO), for the United States Army, had this 
to say about the Army’s role in network centric operations (Wages 2007): 
 
“Our Army is in the midst of a transformational effort to become a net-centric, 
knowledge based force.  In today's environment, modular forces will be integrated 
with a highly networked backbone with every Soldier serving as an extension of 
the GIG.” 
 
At the same conference, Dan Garvey, U.S. Army CIO/G-6, spoke in terms of cultural 
shifts to embrace the technology (Garvey 2007): 
 
“The characteristics of operating in the Net-Centric Operating Environment 
demand that both the culture and technology adapt so that rapid and ubiquitous 
access to relevant information becomes a distinct strategic and tactical 
advantage. This challenge is not only merely the acquisition of more systems or 
connections, but involves a cultural shift that allows relevant information to be 
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readily accessible where it is needed, without the impediments of organizational 
barriers or excess infrastructure.” 
 
The Fog of War 
 
Carl von Clausewitz wrote Vom Kriege (on War) between 1816 and 1830, based on 
his experiences during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.  Published 
posthumously in 1832 by his wife, it introduced the world to the concept of “the fog of 
war”.  Included in this treatise is the famous phrase:  "War is the realm of uncertainty; 
three quarters of the factors on which action is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or 
lesser uncertainty."  The development of this decision support environment is the next 
step in reducing the fog of war and moving towards total situational awareness and 
knowledge transfer.  As stated by Alberts, Et al. in Network Centric Warfare (1999): 
 
“The fact that warfare will always be characterized by fog, friction, complexity, 
and irrationality circumscribes but does not negate the benefits that network-
centric operations can provide to the forces in terms of improved battlespace 
awareness and access to distributed assets. While predicting human and 
organizational behavior will remain well beyond the state of the art, having a 
better near real-time picture of what is happening (in situations where this is 
possible from observing things that move, emit, etc.) certainly reduces uncertainty 
in a meaningful way. 
 
The traditional role of the decision support system is to enable the decision maker in a 
fairly static and rigid hierarchical organization.  The role of “who decides what” is 
largely a function of a higher headquarters in any typical organizational structure (Simon 
1947).  What we are proposing is a new form of decision support system: the decision 
support environment (DSE)-whereby a given network adapts to strengthen those links 
between experts and non-experts (human and / or machine) as the environment and 
operational necessity requires.  Typically this will present itself in crisis management and 
military operations.  
 
Traditional Decision Support Systems 
 
The current view of the computer-based decision support system is typically one of 
five themes (Powers 2007): 
 
1. Communications Driven-as exemplified by Microsoft Groove and other such 
types of collaborative software, enabling various actors to engage in shared 
tasking. 
2. Data Driven-as the name implies, this is data driven and relies on access to 
relevant databases to support decision making (Marakas 2003) 
3. Model Driven-using models to leverage existing processes and simplify 
decision making. 
4.  Document Driven-using unstructured documents (usually in the form of 
electronic documentation) to facilitate decision making. 
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5.  Knowledge Driven-knowledge based and dependent on access to specific and 
supporting knowledge experts (human and machine) to facilitate decision 
making. 
 
These themes have largely remained constant for the past 50 years.  While many in 
the field argue over the specifics of the exact boundaries of the decision support field, 
these themes have emerged as convenient buckets in which to bin the various categories 
of toolsets used to assist the human actor in the process of processing ever increasing data 
and information flows. 
 
Decision Making Models 
 
The current field of decision support systems can then be grouped as one of three 
main decision making models:  
 
1.  John Boyd’s four phase and feedback dependent Observe, Orient, Decide, Act 
loop (also known as OODA Loop) (Coram 2002) in which the aim of the decision 
support model is to get an advantage over an opponent by “getting inside his 
decision cycle”.  First applied to Air Force aerial combat, it has since moved to 
the business realm.  Of particular note in the diagram below is the fact that this 
loop is actually a continually updating series of interacting loops-hence the 
reliance on continuous feedback. 
 
 













2.  Herb Simon’s three phase problem solving model (Simon 1979) which is 
hierarchical in nature and designed as such for its robustness.  In effect, it is a series of 
events which begins by identifying all relevant alternatives to the task at hand, 
development of consequences to align with the alternatives, and finally, a comparison 





























3.  The network centric themed Collaboration Significant Influences model of 
Alberts and Hayes-a much more evolved and detailed model than the previous 
two. (2006).  
 
 
Alberts and Hayes Collaboration Significant Influences Model 
 
 
It is important to note the significance to which Alberts and Hayes place on the value 
of information.  Also, one can note how independent of hierarchy the Alberts and Hayes 
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model is.  In fact, this may not go far enough as it is knowledge which enables action and 
therefore should be the focus of a decision support framework (Nissen, 2006). 
 
Groupware and Group Support Systems  
 
Alternatively, there is another area of decision support systems which deals with a 
concept known as groupware-that is, the collaborative sharing of information in a 
synchronous and asynchronous manner across distributed environments.  Of special 
interests is the field of Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW).  This field is 
not without its own significant challenges (Bordetsky, Mark 2000).  Perhaps the most 
important challenge as it pertains to the TNT MIO is the ability of groupware to enable a 
sense of shared awareness in real or near real-time (Bordetsky, Mark 2000).  Another 
issue is the ability to transfer knowledge in a meaningful way that is understood by all 
members of the team.  It is these challenges which lend caution to our inclusion of this 
type of decision support system to the TNT MIO architecture. 
 
Briggs, Nunamaker, and Sprague have explored the idea of group support systems or 
GSS even further.  Defined as “a suite of software tools, each of which focuses team 
efforts in some unique way” (Briggs, Et al 2000), many have stated that the field of GSS 
research is dead.  However, the state of the art in GSS research does not presently support 
the needs of the tactical or crisis management team.  That said, this field deserves more in 
depth review and research and holds promise for the future of collaborative team work in 




Accordingly, there are any number of traits that a given decision support system 
should have.  According to Turban et al. the ideal characteristics of a decision support 
system are as follows (1997): 
1. Support for decision makers in semi structured and unstructured problems.  
2. Support managers at all levels.  
3. Support individuals and groups.  
4. Support for interdependent or sequential decisions.  
5. Support intelligence, design, choice, and implementation.  
6. Support variety of decision processes and styles.  
7. DSS should be adaptable and flexible.  
8. DSS should be interactive and provide ease of use.  
9. Effectiveness balanced with efficiency (benefit must exceed cost).  
10. Complete control by decision-makers.  
11. Ease of development by (modification to suit needs and changing environment) 
end users.  
12. Support modeling and analysis.  
13. Data access.  
14. Standalone, integration and Web-based. 
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The conventional decision support system has existed largely unchanged for the past 
50 years, and we argue that even with the addition of the computer as an enabler, the DSS 
as it has evolved has now arrived at a point in time which calls for a revolution in terms 
of capability.  This revolution is the direct result of incredible benefits of modern 
networking capabilities and the current conceptual work done in the network centric 
operations field. 
 
The Experimental Design 
 
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the arrival of the decision support 
environment and the concept of dynamic knowledge mesh flows is the question of 
analytical measures of effectiveness (MOE).  That is, how does one show value gained 
for implementation of the necessary networking and collaborative schema to support this 
on a global scale. 
 
Early attempts at giving measure to the relative value of information were born out by 
such authors as Nyquist (1924) and Hartely (1928).  Also of note was the work of 
statistician Fisher in 1925.  However, we look to the seminal work done by Claude 
Shannon in 1948 and his reference paper, “A Mathematical Theory of Communications” 
for the broadest and most relevant foundation of information theory.  It is here that we 
start in our design of experimentation. 
 
The RAND Arroyo Center published a book in 2001 entitled Measures of 
Effectiveness for the Information Age-Army.  In it, the authors describe information as 
having two distinct characteristics:  value and quality.  They tie this concept in with the 
notion that knowledge is actually information that has relevance and is therefore deemed 
valuable (2001).  It is this framework with which we will use to capture our data.  
 
Design Considerations and Parameters 
 
One of the most important considerations when trying to measure knowledge transfer 
is figuring out exactly what it is you are trying to measure.  Our initial step is to identify 
those variables for which we are interested in and really amount to the attributes of the 
desired measurements. As outlined in Code of Best Practice for Experimentation, metrics 
and measures of effectiveness should always start with a grouping or list of the desired 
dependent variables (Alberts 2005).  Developed by the United States Navy, he model 
below is the thought process used for deriving our measurement metrics.   
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The KM Measurement Process, Department of the Navy 2001 
 
As stated in the U.S. Navy Metrics Guide for Knowledge Management Initiatives 
(2001), the most important consideration is whether or not the metric tells us if the 
knowledge is being shared and used.  Another consideration is whether to pursue 
qualitative or quantitative measurements.  We use this then as a guide to the development 






Unit of Measure 
Output Measures 
Counts, estimates, surveys 
 
Outcome Measures 
Hard to define (intangibles)  Track Changes / Differences 
 
Level of Knowledge 





Quantitative (Hard data) # 
 
Number of Nodes-Human   
Quantity # 
 






Size of the Network 
Quantity # (Degree of scale between expert nodes) 
 
Network Link Density 
Quantity # 
 
Decision Time (Speed of Reaction) 
Minutes 
 
Method of Transfer 
Descriptor (VHF, UHF, Voice, IP, VOIP, etc 
 
Degree of Separation between Nodes 
Quantity # 
 
Type of knowledge 
Tacit or Implicit 
 
Operational Roles 





The relationships developed between the variables listed above will serve to help 
identify the strengths and weakness of the three models of decision making and it is 
hoped that the outcome of the experimentation will help showcase the merits of our new 
decision support environment based on knowledge flows.  Some of these relationships 
will be “discovered” during the course of the experimentation while others present 
themselves readily-an example being the number of nodes and the distance between 
“actioner” and command unit or node. 
 
Pareto Set of Criteria 
 
There are many advantages to moving towards a network centric decision support 
environment (dynamic knowledge flow mesh) but perhaps the greatest indicator of its 
usefulness is the level of effectiveness.  The Pareto Set of criteria lends itself to this study 
as we in effect, attempt to “optimize” the transfer of knowledge across the network and 
make the decision support environment as effective and efficient as it can be given its ad-
hoc nature.  Some examples would be a reduction in response time or an increaser in the 
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amount of knowledge flow across a given topology within the decision support 
environment.  
 
The result of this experiment is the optimization of the decision support environment 
in a given operational condition-be it military, crisis management, or disaster relief. 
 
Building the Experiment 
 
The primary goal of the experimentation phase is the successful discovery of the 
knowledge flows within the adapting network topology and to ultimately identify the best 
decision support model with which to support knowledge flows.  We begin with three 
phases of experimentation: 
 
1.  Pre-experimentation (what we know, what we think, and what we are going to 
do). 
 
2. Conduct the experiment (the empirical data and observations). 
 
3. Post-experimentation (revised model, lessons learned, and data for future 
experimentation). 
 
The bulk of our effort will be placed in the “pre-experimentation” phase in which we 
codify that information and knowledge we have, develop a series of assumptions and/or 
hypothesis, and design the experiment (Alberts, Et al. 2005).  Our goal is the 
identification of knowledge flows and the adaptability of the network to enable such 
flows in a timely and decisive manner.  By establishing a well-bounded experimentation 
routine and setup in the pre-experimentation phase in the pursuit of what is already 
known, we can identify any issues early on which may hamper our ability to later move 
the experimentation into unknown waters and enter the discovery mode of 
experimentation.  In terms of resource allocation, this can save us huge amounts of time 




Interesting work has been done recently in this field.  In particular, the work of 
Hutchins, Bordetsky, Kendall and Bourakov and the Empirical Assessment of Team 
Collaboration (2006) is well suited to our task.  In it, the authors utilize the TNT MIO as 
the basis for team collaboration using off the shelf collaboration tools sets such as 
Microsoft Groove.  In a similar vein, we propose setting up a scenario-based sense 
making utilizing the TNT MIO supporting architecture. 
 
We posit that three separate yet identical tactical scenarios be run, each with the goal 
of getting the best and most current knowledge flow to the primary actor.  In this case, 
the primary actor is the boarding party officer, yet we understand that due to the 
unpredictable nature of tactical situations, the ability of another member to gain a 
position of knowledge dominance needs to be looked at and monitored.  This is in a 
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sense, the power of network centric operations and particularly relevant given today’s 
networking and collaboration tools.  
 
Using a Lickert scale model based on a rating of 1-10, each scenario would be run in 
an identical manner and the criteria listed above assessed.  Of course, certain relevance 
would be placed on knowledge and its use as we see this as the foundation of the new 
decision support system.  The standard to be measured against would encompass 
accuracy, efficiency, and effectiveness.  This raw data can then be analyzed to give a 
statistical grounding in the development of our new model (Post-experimentation phase).  
In effect, what we are looking for is a standard of fitness based on the scenario in which 
the goal is the identification of key attributes which support the need for a new network 
centric model.  The resultant data can then be mapped to a multidimensional visualization 
in order to tease out the requisite characteristics for each model as it applies to each 
 
scenario.  See figure below for an output example. 






Sample hypothesis for testing utilize the methodology contained in Alberts and Hayes 
Cod
f we reduce the amount of non-critical nodes (machine and human) between command 
of information access to the MIO boarding party, then 
 link critical knowledge experts, then the 
xperimental Baseline 
The proposed experiment baseline is to be the TNT MIO baseline stated earlier at the 
beg
The stated goals and objectives of TNT MIO 07-4 (Joint USSOCOM-NPS-LLNL Field 
Exp









This paper has shown that there exists a gap between the current thought regarding 
dec , 
react, 
One area that we believe to have special importance is the nature of the knowledge 
flow as it pertains to the boarding party and its relationship with the C2 nodes spread out 
 
e of Best Practice for Experimentation (2005) include: 
  
-I
node and actioner, then the reaction time will decrease. 
 
-If we increase the amount 
knowledge will increase. 
 
-If we reduce the amount of time needed to




inning of this paper: 
 
eriment Augmented by OSD/HD MDA Programs), to be conducted in the San 
Francisco Bay areas in September 2007 are as follows: 
 
advanced sensors, and collaborative technology for rapid Maritime Interdiction
Operations (MIO); specifically, the ability for a Boarding Party to rapidly set up
ship-to-ship communications that permit them to search for radiation and 
explosive sources while maintaining network connectivity with C2 organiza
and collaborating with remotely located sensor experts.  
analysis, and situational understanding process of network-centric MIO to a
level of fidelity (Bordetsky 2007). 
C
 
ision support systems and the tactical application of modern communication devices
networking capability, sensor saturation, and maturation of mobile technologies.  We 
have provided a framework and measures of effectiveness for the testing of future 
implementations of hybrid decision support environments with the ability to sense, 








itecture already exists in the form of the TNT MIO Field 
xperimentation and it is now time to develop the model for knowledge transfer in a 
dyn nse 
or Future Experimentation:  Knowledge Mapping and GSS 
r at the 
niversity of Arizona.  Specifically, the field of Group Support Systems and it’s 
rele
t is 
, Garstka, J., & Stein, F. P. (1999). Network centric warfare: Developing 
and leveraging information superiority. CCRP Publications Distribution Center.  
Albe
Research Program., Washington, DC,  
Alberts, D. S., & Hayes, R. E. (2003). Power to the edge. Command and Control 
Research Program., Washington, DC,  
Albe of best practice for experimentationDoD 
Command and Control Research Program.  
And /2007, 2007, from 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Andrew_Marshall
ss geographical boundaries.  The study of this ecology presents a perfect opportunit
to identify the use of links to channel this flow across the various human and machine 
expert systems in addition to the primary “actioners”.  The results gleaned from the 
controlled TNT MIO Field Experiments should serve to better inform the current 
operational issues facing such complex endeavors as UAV operations as they curren
posture and the anticipated operational debut of the combat UAV or CUAVs curre
theatre.  We intend to use the three scenarios as a chance to “map” these knowledge 
flows.   This also has the advantage of identifying or ‘pointing” to those individuals who 
maintain tacit knowledge repositories in addition to those explicit knowledge clumps









Finally, there is a valid need to look into the work of Briggs and Nunamake
U
vance in the asynchronous virtual world of tactical operations and crisis management.  
It is our belief that this area is rich in opportunity for current military operations. I
believed that once the technology matures to a point where it can support graphical 
intensive knowledge exchange in near to real time, that this may produce some 
interesting enables to support our work. 
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Knowledge Flow Mesh and its Dynamics:
A Decision Support Environment
13th ICCRTS: C2 Architectures Track
Major Jack L. Koons III, USA
2Motivation
• Personal Experience
– Desert Storm and The Long War
• Advances in Modern Communications and Networking Ability
• Sensor Saturation &Maturation of Mobile Technology
• USSOCOM and NPS Partnership
• Arrival of Network Centric Warfare
– Post Desert Storm of 1991
• Air Plan Briefs to Airborne Downloads
– FCS, UAVs, and UCAVs
• The Reaper
3DSS to DSE
In today’s dynamic, information rich, and high operational tempo, the need 
for a robust, resilient, and adaptable decision support environment is 
greater than ever before.  
Of particular emphasis here is the context of a “network-centric” approach 
or lens.  Existing literature focuses on the development of the decision 
support system as a “system” under the control of one or more decision 
makers (Marakas 2003)).  
Added to this is the need for a clearly defined problem statement which 
then, in turn, relates to a particular form of decision support system.  
The form of DSS is based upon the problem structure, the type of
outcome needed, and finally, the type of overhead or control required.
4DSS Gap
Earlier attempts to bind the characteristics of robust decision support 
systems with the requisite ability to serve as a knowledge flow enablers to 
include the ability to adapt and mesh with existing networks and systems 
have come up short.  
Articles and conference papers by such leading edge researchers as 
Bordetsky, Hayes-Roth and Vega, Clements, and Thompson have 
attempted to either bin the particular DSS as either hybrid (Vega, et al. 
2007) or place the functionality onto an architectural structure (Bordetsky, 
Hayes-Roth 2007). 
5DSS Gap:  GSS Update
Briggs, Nunamaker, Sprague
The University of Arizona
Center for the Management of Information
Group Support Systems:  Defined as “a suite of software tools, each of 
which focuses team efforts in some unique way” (Briggs, Et al 2000), 
many have stated that the field of GSS research is dead.
However, the state of the art in GSS research does not presently support 
the needs of the tactical or crisis management team.  That said, this field 
deserves more in depth review and research and holds promise for the 
future of collaborative team work in a virtual environment.
6Research Question
• Which DSS is best suited for today’s rapidly adapting and evolving 
network centric tactical situations?
• In this paper we introduce the concept of Knowledge Flow Mesh Dynamics
within a decision support environment, which we argue is the logical heir 
to a new type of decision support system as seen through the network 
centric lens. 
7Prior and Ongoing Research 
• “Leverage experiments that identify key gaps and deficiencies resulting 
from applications of advanced technology, unmanned systems, and net 
centric applications”
• USSOCOM and NPS Partnership





– Enhanced Battlefield Medical SA
8Decision Support Environment
• Identification of Knowledge Nodes
– Knowledge Flows (Nissen, 2006)
– Human or Machine
– Dynamic (Right Expert-Right Time)
• Bandwidth Optimization
• Think IP Packets / Knowledge Packets & Nodes
We are trying to enable the dynamic transfer of knowledge across 
as yet to be determined network topologies and architectures at the 
right time and location.










– New Information Created
10
Building the Experiment
The primary goal of the experimentation phase is the successful discovery 
of the knowledge flows within the adapting network topology and to 
ultimately identify the best decision support model with which to support 
knowledge flows.  We begin with three phases of experimentation:
1.  Pre-experimentation (what we know, what we think, and what we 
are going to do).
2. Conduct the experiment (the empirical data and observations).
3. Post-experimentation (revised model, lessons learned, and data for 
future experimentation).
The bulk of our effort will be placed in the “pre-experimentation” phase in 
which we codify that information and knowledge we have, develop a series 
of assumptions and/or hypothesis, and design the experiment
11
Hypothesis Testing
Sample hypothesis for testing utilize the methodology contained in Alberts 
and Hayes Code of Best Practice for Experimentation (2005) include:
-If we reduce the amount of non-critical nodes (machine and human) 
between command node and actioner, then the reaction time will 
decrease.
-If we increase the amount of information access to the MIO boarding 
party, then knowledge will increase.
-If we reduce the amount of time needed to link critical knowledge 




The proposed experiment baseline is to be the TNT MIO baseline stated 
earlier at the beginning of this paper:
The stated goals and objectives of TNT MIO 07-4 (Joint USSOCOM-NPS-LLNL 
Field Experiment Augmented by OSD/HD MDA Programs), to be conducted in the 
San Francisco Bay areas are as follows:
The objective of this experiment is to continue to evaluate the use of networks, 
advanced sensors, and collaborative technology for rapid Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO); specifically, the ability for a Boarding Party to rapidly set up 
ship-to-ship communications that permit them to search for radiation and explosive 
sources while maintaining network connectivity with C2 organizations and 
collaborating with remotely located sensor experts. 
The particular goal for TNT MIO 07-4 is to take the discovery, constraints analysis, 




We posit that three separate yet identical tactical scenarios be run, each 
with the goal of getting the best and most current knowledge flow to the 
primary actor.  
In this case, the primary actor is the boarding party officer, yet we 
understand that due to the unpredictable nature of tactical situations, the 
ability of another member to gain a position of knowledge dominance 
needs to be looked at and monitored.
This is in a sense, the power of network centric operations and particularly 
relevant given today’s networking and collaboration tools.
14
Data Collection
Using a Lickert scale model based on a rating of 1-10, each scenario would 
be run in an identical manner and the criteria listed above assessed.  
Certain relevance would be placed on knowledge and its use as we see this 
as the foundation of the new decision support system.  The standard to be 
measured against would encompass accuracy, efficiency, and effectiveness.  
This raw data can then be analyzed to give a statistical grounding in the 
development of our new model (Post-experimentation phase).
In effect, what we are looking for is a standard of fitness based on the 
scenario in which the goal is the identification of key attributes which 
support the need for a new network centric model.  
The resultant data can then be mapped to a multidimensional visualization 
in order to tease out the requisite characteristics for each model as it applies 
to each scenario.
15
Multidimensional Visualization Matrix of Outputs
16
Limitations
• The Network is Impersonal
– Information and Data are Easy
– Transfer Bits and Error Checking
• Knowledge Transfer is Personal
– Tacit vice Explicit
– Hardest to Transfer (Nissen, 2006)
17
Implications for Future Research
One area that we believe to have special importance is the nature of the 
knowledge flow as it pertains to the boarding party and its relationship with 
the C2 nodes spread out across geographical boundaries.  
The study of this ecology presents a perfect opportunity to identify the use 
of links to channel this flow across the various human and machine expert 
systems in addition to the primary “actioners”.  
We intend to use the three scenarios as a chance to “map” these knowledge 
flows.   This also has the advantage of identifying or ‘pointing” to those 
individuals who maintain tacit knowledge repositories in addition to those 
explicit knowledge clumps that are to be expected. 
18
Further Research
Finally, there is a valid need to look into the work of Briggs and Nunamaker at 
the University of Arizona.  Specifically, the field of Group Support Systems
and it’s relevance in the asynchronous virtual world of tactical operations and 
crisis management.  
It is believed that once the technology matures to a point where it can support 
graphical intensive knowledge exchange in near to real time, that this may 
produce some interesting enables to support our work.
19
Questions and Comments
